The reaction function channel of monetary policy and the financial cycle by Filardo, Andrew et al.
  
 
THE REACTION FUNCTION CHANNEL 
OF MONETARY POLICY AND THE 
FINANCIAL CYCLE 
 
Andrew Filardo 
Paul Hubert 
Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCIENCES PO OFCE WORKING PAPER n° 16/2019 
 
  
  
  
 
EDITORIAL BOARD 
Chair: Xavier Ragot (Sciences Po, OFCE)  
 
Members: Jérôme Creel (Sciences Po, OFCE), Eric Heyer (Sciences Po, OFCE), Lionel Nesta (Université 
Nice Sophia Antipolis), Xavier Timbeau (Sciences Po, OFCE) 
 
 
 
CONTACT US 
OFCE 
10 place de Catalogne | 75014 Paris | France  
Tél. +33 1 44 18 54 24  
 
 
www.ofce.fr 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER CITATION 
 
 
This Working Paper: 
Andrew Filardo, Paul Hubert and Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul 
The reaction function channel of monetary policy and the financial cycle 
Sciences Po OFCE Working Paper, n° 16/2019.  
Downloaded from URL: www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/dtravail/WP2019-16.pdf  
DOI - ISSN 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2019 OFCE 
  
 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
Andrew Filardo, Bank for International Settlements and International Monetary Fund, 
Email Address: afilardo@imf.org 
Paul Hubert, Sciences Po OFCE, 
Email Address: paul.hubert@sciencespo.fr 
Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul, Bank for International Settlements, 
Email Address: phurichai.rungcharoenkitkul@bis.org 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines whether monetary policy reaction function matters for financial stability. We measure how responsive 
the Federal Reserve’s policy appears to be to imbalances in the equity, housing and credit markets. We find that changes 
in these policy sensitivities predict the later development of financial imbalances. When monetary policy appears to respond 
more countercyclically to market overheating, imbalances tend to decline over time. This effect is distinct from that of current 
and anticipated interest rate levels – the risk-taking channel. The evidence highlights the importance of a “policy reaction 
function” channel of monetary policy in shaping the financial cycle. 
 
 
KEY WORDS 
Policy reaction function channel, asset price booms, credit booms, monetary policy, financial cycles, time-
varying models. 
JEL  
E50, E52, G00, G01, G12. 
  

 
The reaction function channel of monetary policy  
and the financial cycle ∗ 
 
Andrew Filardo, Paul Hubert and Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul† 
26 September 2019 
Abstract  
This paper examines whether monetary policy reaction function matters for financial stability. 
We measure how responsive the Federal Reserve’s policy appears to be to imbalances in the 
equity, housing and credit markets. We find that changes in these policy sensitivities predict 
the later development of financial imbalances. When monetary policy appears to respond more 
countercyclically to market overheating, imbalances tend to decline over time. This effect is 
distinct from that of current and anticipated interest rate levels – the risk-taking channel. The 
evidence highlights the importance of a “policy reaction function” channel of monetary policy 
in shaping the financial cycle.  
 
JEL classification: E50, E52, G00, G01, G12.  
Keywords: Policy reaction function channel, asset price booms, credit booms, monetary 
policy, financial cycles, time-varying models. 
                                                     
∗  We would like to thank Ryan Banerjee, Claudio Borio, Christophe Blot, Stijn Claessens, Fergus Cumming, Jérôme 
Creel, Fiorella De Fiore, Piti Disyatat, Lucyna Gornicka, Boris Hofmann, Mikael Juselius, Benoît Mojon, Jouchi 
Nakajima, Giovanni Ricco, seminar participants at the BIS, OFCE and INFER workshop in Bordeaux as well as 
conference participants at the IAAE 2019 and CEBRA Annual Meetings 2019 for helpful comments. Burcu Erik 
provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are ours. The views expressed are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank for International Settlements, International Monetary Fund or 
Sciences Po.  
†  Hubert (corresponding author), Sciences Po – OFCE, paul.hubert@sciencespo.fr; Filardo: Bank for International 
Settlements and International Monetary Fund, afilardo@imf.org; Rungcharoenkitkul: Bank for International 
Settlements, phurichai.rungcharoenkitkul@bis.org. 
Table of contents 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1 
1. The reaction function channel: theoretical foundations ................................................................... 4 
1.1 Speculative demand .......................................................................................................................... 4 
1.2 Asset pricing ......................................................................................................................................... 5 
1.3 Behavioural finance ........................................................................................................................... 6 
2. Systematic policy reaction and financial cycles .................................................................................. 6 
2.1 Empirical strategy ............................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 Measuring financial imbalances ................................................................................................... 8 
2.3 Estimating the policy reaction function .................................................................................... 10 
2.4 Effects of policy reaction on the financial cycles ................................................................. 12 
3. Extensions ........................................................................................................................................................ 16 
3.1 Risk-taking channel and sensitivity to unemployment and inflation ................................. 16 
3.2 The role of a central bank put ........................................................................................................... 16 
3.3 Boom-bust amplitudes ......................................................................................................................... 18 
3.4 Robustness tests .................................................................................................................................... 19 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................................... 20 
References .................................................................................................................................................................... 21 
Appendix ......................................................................................................................................................................... 26 
 The reaction function channel of monetary policy and the financial cycle 1 
 
Introduction 
Should central banks lean against the build-up of financial imbalances? The debate on this 
question has evolved considerably over the decades. Before the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), the 
predominant view was one of benign neglect, i.e. deflating financial booms with monetary policy 
is too costly relative to standing by and cleaning up after busts.1 One major concern is that 
monetary policy is too blunt a tool, and leaning can create significant collateral damage. 
Since the GFC, views have evolved somewhat and the role of financial stability in 
monetary policy has gained some ground. First, there is a growing empirical evidence on a 
relationship between credit/asset price booms and financial crises (e.g. Borio and Drehmann 
(2009), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jordà et al (2015), Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016) and 
Mian et al (2017)). Second, the link between the monetary policy stance and financial booms, the 
“risk-taking channel” of monetary policy, has been extensively documented (e.g. Borio and Zhu 
(2008), Adrian and Shin (2010), Jimenez et al (2012), and Dell’Ariccia et al (2017)).2 Third, 
theoretical advances have helped shed light on various mechanisms through which financial 
imperfections could affect macroeconomic outcomes (see Claessens and Kose (2017) for a 
review). The debate has thus been revived, with monetary policy taking centre stage again.3  
This paper contributes to the debate by examining a distinct mechanism through which 
monetary policy can influence the financial cycle: the “policy reaction function” channel. This 
channel captures how the apparent responsiveness of monetary policy to movements in financial 
variables affects future evolution of the latter. Under this channel, market beliefs about the central 
bank’s likely reaction to scenarios of financial market frothiness – the conditional paths of the 
policy rate under these scenarios – matter. They shape beliefs about the prospective returns to 
investment, including those driven by speculative motives, thus influencing investors’ incentives 
to take on risks and ultimately affect financial variables today. 
                                                     
1  For earlier debate on the role of asset prices in monetary policy, see Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Borio and 
Lowe (2002), Cecchetti et al (2000), Filardo (2001, 2012), Bean (2003); for a similar view in the recent literature, see IMF 
(2015) and Svensson (2017). 
2  Pre-crisis studies typically find that monetary shocks negatively affect stock prices (e.g. Rigobon and Sack (2004) and 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). Recent works shed further light on the intricate relationship between policy and asset 
prices. Bassetto et al (2016) document a two-way reaction between monetary policy and financial conditions. Galí and 
Gambetti (2015) find that positive monetary policy shocks exacerbate the bubble component of the US equity prices. 
Blot et al (2018) find little evidence that contractionary monetary policy shocks deflate asset price bubbles. Paul (2019) 
notes that stock market and house price reactions to monetary policy shocks were low prior to the GFC. Bianchi et al 
(2018) and Filardo et al (2019) find a low-frequency association between low levels of short-term real interest rates 
and high asset valuations, pointing to a risk-taking channel at work in asset price booms. 
3  The normative role of monetary policy is subject to an ongoing debate. Galí (2014) argues that a higher interest rate 
increases the size of the rational bubble rather than contains it. Allen et al (2018) argues that this finding is sensitive 
to credit and default costs. Adrian and Duarte (2017) introduce time-varying value-at-risk constraints in a New 
Keynesian model, which justify a role for policy to address financial vulnerabilities. Filardo and Rungcharoenkitkul 
(2018) show that a systematic leaning policy is optimal in a model of recurring financial boom-bust cycles. Gourio et 
al (2017) demonstrate that an economy subject to excess credit growth and tail risks calls for a leaning policy. 
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Our focus on the systematic component of monetary policy echoes earlier works that 
emphasise the importance of policy rules as opposed to unanticipated policy shocks. Bernanke et 
al (1997), Hoover and Jordà (2001) and Taylor (1995) recognise that monetary policy shocks 
account for only a small part of the policy instrument variations, and highlight the role of 
systematic policy response to other economic shocks. One may extend this line of enquiry and 
ask whether some systematic character of monetary policy could generate effects even more 
general than the linear endogenous feedback considered in standard models such as VAR. Such 
possibility remains largely unexplored in the literature, however. This paper ventures into this vast 
unknown territory, zooming in on one specific channel that links policy responsiveness to financial 
market developments.         
Closely related to the reaction function channel considered in this paper is the risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy. The latter is defined by Borio and Zhu (2008) as “…the impact of 
changes in policy rates on either risk perceptions or risk-tolerance and hence on the degree of risk 
in the portfolios, on the pricing of assets, and on the price and non-price terms of the extension of 
funding”, and may encapsulate “…the set of objectives that the central bank pursues together with 
the norms and patterns of behaviour through which it pursues them, including notably the central 
bank’s reaction function”. Under this broad definition, the reaction function channel discussed in 
this paper is a subset of the risk-taking channel. 
It is common in this literature, however, to focus on a narrower and more workable 
definition of the risk-taking channel, one that operates only through the current level of the policy 
interest rate or its expected future path. Namely, it is the unconditional monetary policy stance 
that influences financial risk-taking. This is indeed the working definition in most recent empirical 
studies on the risk-taking channel. For example, in Adrian and Shin (2010), Jimenez et al (2012), 
and Dell’Ariccia et al (2017), the risk-taking channel is defined as operating narrowly through the 
levels and changes in the short-term interest rate. Most theoretical models also share the same 
perspective of the risk-taking channel (e.g. Dubecq et al (2015)).  
To illustrate the difference between the reaction function and the (narrow) risk-taking 
channels, suppose the central bank is concerned about the financial stability risk arising from 
speculative demand for financial assets. To curb risks associated with this behaviour, the central 
bank could rely on the risk-taking channel by raising the level of the policy interest rate to increase 
the funding cost of speculation. Alternatively, the central bank could signal its intention to tighten 
policy in response to increases in asset price imbalances. If credible, such a promise would induce 
investors to revise down the probability of making a capital gain.4 In so doing, the central bank 
reduces the investors’ incentives to speculate today. This is the policy reaction function channel. 
The reaction function channel is familiar in the context of inflation stabilisation. In the 
conventional Taylor rule, the policy response to inflation must be sufficiently strong – i.e. 
consistent with the Taylor Principle – otherwise monetary policy will become procyclical and 
destabilising (Taylor (1993, 1999)). Analogously, if monetary policy responds insufficiently to 
                                                     
4  Such policy could also lessen any market perception of a “central bank put”, i.e. that monetary policy would respond 
asymmetrically to financial developments, thereby skewing the perceived probability distribution of asset returns. 
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frothy financial conditions, the incentive for market participants to speculate could grow thereby 
aiding and abetting financial risk-taking in a self-reinforcing manner.  
The policy reaction function and the narrow risk-taking channels are likely to work hand 
in hand in practice. Both a higher interest rate and a signal to react more strongly to potential 
financial exuberance can help pre-empt an asset price boom. On the flip side, the two channels 
may also reinforce each other in a destabilising way. If overly optimistic, the beliefs of both market 
participants and policymakers may contribute to unsustainable asset price increases.  
Despite their complementary roles, the distinction between the two channels matters 
because their policy implications are fundamentally different. If the risk-taking channel is 
predominant, discretionary increases in policy rates in response to risk-taking excesses may be 
sufficient to safeguard financial stability, if at some macroeconomic cost. Evidence of a significant 
reaction function channel would bolster the case for systematic leaning-against-the-wind 
monetary policies and a clear communication about the reaction function. As it works by shaping 
private expectations and pre-empting excessive risk-taking, the reaction function channel may 
prove more cost effective over time vis-à-vis purely discretionary policies. The objective of this 
paper is to provide positive inputs into this normative debate, in the form of empirical evidence.  
We evaluate the relevance and strength of the reaction function channel empirically by 
employing a two-step procedure. First, we estimate the apparent time-varying reaction of US 
monetary policy to real-time macroeconomic and financial conditions, from January 1979 to June 
2017. In addition to expected inflation and unemployment, the reaction function includes three 
measures of financial imbalances; those with respect to equity prices, housing prices and credit. 
Second, we examine the dynamic relationship between these estimated time-varying policy 
reaction coefficients and the subsequent evolution of the financial cycle using local projections à 
la Jordà (2005).  
The main result is that, when US monetary policy is systematically more responsive to 
financial conditions in a countercyclical manner, subsequent financial imbalances tend to 
moderate over time. This reaction function channel holds across equity, housing and private credit 
markets. This effect operates beyond that of the narrow risk-taking channel, namely via the level 
of short-term interest rates, and is robust to controlling for the signalling channel of monetary 
policy and a wide range of alternative measurement choices and specifications. 
The first step of our procedure resonates with the earlier literature on whether US 
monetary policy responds to stock market prices.5 Note, however, that our reaction function 
hypothesis does not require the central bank’s true reaction function to include financial 
imbalances. What matters is that market participants observe an apparent reaction of monetary 
policy to financial variables, and believe it to be persistent. Even if the central bank does not 
intend to follow a certain policy rule that reacts to financial markets, any perception that it does 
                                                     
5  Rigobon and Sack (2004) find that the FOMC’s response to stock prices is statistically significant. Ravn (2012) uses a 
similar methodology and finds some evidence that the FOMC reacted asymmetrically to stock prices. This asymmetry 
result has been corroborated by Hofmann (2012) and Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018). Meanwhile, Furlanetto 
(2011) argues that the Rigobon-Sack finding is not robust to broadening of the sample, whereas Fuhrer and Tootell 
(2008) find that FOMC responds to stock market movements only when they help predict key policy target variables. 
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can still influence asset prices and financial risk-taking. Our estimated time-varying policy rule 
should thus be interpreted as a perceived or apparent policy reaction. 
The second empirical step is more novel, as very few studies have dealt with the reaction 
function channel. One such instance is Bianchi et al (2018), who find that high asset valuation 
regimes appear to coincide with greater policy activism vis-à-vis output growth and less activism 
vis-à-vis inflation. Our finding corroborates their results, but offers a more comprehensive 
assessment. Our work is a systematic treatment aimed to shed light on this distinct transmission 
channel, and complements the already vast empirical evidence for the risk-taking channel. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 formalises the concept of the 
reaction function channel with an aid of stylised theoretical models. Section 2 describes the 
empirical strategy and reports the baseline results. Section 3 addresses extensions and robustness 
issues. The last section summarises and draws policy implications.            
1. The reaction function channel: theoretical foundations 
How does the reaction function channel operate in shaping the financial boom-bust cycles? In 
this section, we illustrate this in the context of some theoretical examples. 
1.1 Speculative demand  
The reaction function channel can curb risk-taking by narrowing the set of equilibria. Consider 
the classic rational expectations model of Muth (1961) and McCafferty and Driskill (1980), 
extended to incorporate monetary policy. The model consists respectively of an asset demand 
function 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 , a supply function 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 , a speculative demand function 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 which depends negatively on 
funding cost 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 , a monetary policy rule determining 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 , and a market-clearing condition: 
 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = −𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝑒𝑒 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓� 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓 = 𝜙𝜙(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝑒𝑒 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝑒𝑒  is the conditional expectation of price 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 based on information at time 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 is a 
white noise with variance 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2. Solving for the rational expectations equilibrium gives 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 (1) 
where 𝜆𝜆 is a solution to 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜙𝜙)(1 − 𝜆𝜆)2 = (𝛾𝛾 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜆𝜆, and 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is a white noise with a conditional 
variance 
 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡,12 = 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2
�𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜙𝜙)(1 − 𝜆𝜆)�2 (2) 
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Speculative investors choose 𝛼𝛼 to maximise a mean-variance utility, which results in an optimal 
degree of speculation 
 𝛼𝛼 = 𝐾𝐾
𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡,12  (3) 
where 𝐾𝐾 captures investors’ risk aversion.  
Multiple equilibria may arise, representing phases of the financial cycle. The conditional 
variance 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡,12  declines with speculative intensity 𝛼𝛼 (equation 2), whereas the optimal choice of 𝛼𝛼 is 
decreasing in 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡,12  (equation 3). The two nonlinear equations are negatively sloped and could 
intersect twice, resulting in two equilibria – one with low asset price (short-term) volatility and 
intense speculation, and the other with higher volatility and less speculation.  
Monetary policy reaction function could help eliminate the first “boom” equilibrium. A 
more countercyclical policy rule (a positive and higher 𝜙𝜙) makes the conditional variance 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡,12  less 
decreasing in 𝛼𝛼. In the limit, this policy reaction removes the low-𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡,12  high-𝛼𝛼 equilibrium. 
Intuitively, the central bank promises to tighten policy if the market ever comes to expect a large 
capital gain, thus lessening the prospective net speculative return. This systematic policy reaction 
makes the expectations of large capital gains untenable in equilibrium. The power of the reaction 
function channel hinges on the sensitivity parameter 𝜙𝜙, which captures what the central bank 
pledges to do under alternative scenarios, rather than the policy stance it ends up implementing.   
1.2 Asset pricing  
The reaction function channel can also operate by shaping the expectation of policy reaction to 
prospective shocks. Consider the standard equity pricing equation 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1(𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1)�  = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+2𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+2 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+2𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+3𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+3 + ⋯ ) (4) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the stock price, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1 is the dividend payment, and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 is the stochastic discount 
factor. Assume that 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 follows an autoregressive process: 
 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝜌𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 1
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡+1 (5) 
where 𝜌𝜌 < 1, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡+1) = 0, and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 is the risk-free interest rate. The unconditional mean of 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 is 1/𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 as is standard. In this example, a “risk appetite” shock 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 has a persistent effect on 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+2, …, and thus an amplified effect on the stock price 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 . However, if the central bank 
follows a systematic policy where 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 rises with 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 , then the central bank can forestall an asset 
price boom. For example, under the policy rule 1/𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 = −𝜌𝜌𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, the realised value of 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 
would have no effect on the stock price. The expectation of a higher risk-free rate whenever future 
risk appetite increases keeps the asset price in check.   
A similar example is the rational bubble model of Galí (2014), which considers a perpetual 
asset that pays no dividend and risk-neutral investors. No-arbitrage implies: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1) (6) 
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There exists a bubbly equilibrium where the asset price is expected to grow at a rate equal to the 
interest rate. As Galí (2014) observed, a policy rule where 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 reacts positively and proportionately 
to the size of the bubble implies an exponential growth in the bubble. However, this result is 
reversed if policy reacts inversely to the bubble size: if 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 = 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡/𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 , then 
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1) = 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 (7) 
The time-varying policy reaction parameter 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 determines the expected level of asset price.6  
1.3 Behavioural finance  
It is also possible that monetary policy reaction function influences the degree of investors’ risk 
appetite or confidence more directly.7 Extending the standard asset pricing model to allow for 
endogenous risk preferences could open up a case for the systematic part of monetary policy to 
drive procyclical asset prices and credit cycles. Consider a generalised asset pricing equation: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝑟𝑟 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1) (8) 
where the expectations operator 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 and the stochastic discount factor 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝑟𝑟  (a function of interest 
rate as well as risk preferences) are both functions of monetary policy rules. Agents may assign a 
subjective probability distribution to price assets that reflect excessive optimism (e.g. associated 
with the kernel of truth property (Bordalo et al (2017, 2018)). It is conceivable that the perceived 
future behaviour of the central bank, not only its current policy stance or latest shocks, influence 
these subjective beliefs. Similarly, a systematic pattern of policy may also affect risk preferences 
of investors, influencing 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝑟𝑟  and hence asset prices, even for a fixed expected path for the policy 
interest rate and asset payoff 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1.8  
2. Systematic policy reaction and financial cycles   
This section presents the baseline empirical results. It starts by describing the empirical strategy 
and construction of key variables. It then explains the estimation of the apparent reaction function 
in a real-time and time-varying manner, before establishing a link of this policy sensitivity to the 
ex post developments of the financial cycle.  
                                                     
6  For other bubble models that emphasise the various links between monetary policy, asset prices, credit and leverage, 
see Miao and Wang (2018), Miao et al (2018), Miao et al (2015) and Dong et al (2017). 
7  This class of model makes explicit the possibility that the policy reaction function inferred by private agents may not 
reflect the central bank’s actual rule. As a result, a perceived change in the policy rule, even if inconsistent with the 
central bank’s ‘true’ preferences, could influence the equilibrium outcome.  
8  Farmer (2013) considers belief mechanisms suggesting policies to reduce bubble-like asset price volatility. Farmer and 
Zabczyk (2016) raise the possibility that central bank balance sheet policies can play a role in influencing non-
fundamental asset price movements. The imperfect knowledge models of Eusepi and Preston (2018), Branch and 
Evans (2011), Zeira (1999) and Burnside (2016) point to learning mechanisms that can generate boom-bust type 
behaviour. This type of behaviour has been borne out by microeconomic studies (Anunfriey and Hommes (2012)). See 
Beaudry and Portier (2014) for a review of news models that result in endogenous cycles in which there is a role of 
policy. 
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2.1 Empirical strategy 
We use a two-step empirical procedure to assess the significance of the policy reaction function 
channel. The first step involves tracking how the reaction function appears to shift over time. We 
estimate a time-varying Taylor rule consistent with the dual mandate of the Federal Reserve, in 
the spirit of Taylor (1993) or Romer and Romer (2004): 
 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋,𝑡𝑡(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜋𝜋∗) + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡� ) + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 (9) 
over rolling samples, where 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the policy rate, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 the expected inflation, 𝜋𝜋∗ the inflation 
target, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1 the expected unemployment rate, and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡�  the CBO’s natural rate of unemployment.9 
The Taylor-rule residual 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 would then contain the exogenous policy innovations as well as the 
systematic reaction to variables uncorrelated with inflation and unemployment:      
 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1,𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽
+ 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡′𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 (10) 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is a real-time measure of financial imbalances corresponding to market 𝑗𝑗, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 is a vector 
of additional macro or financial variables, and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the pure monetary shock. The estimates 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 
measure the time-varying sensitivity of the policy instrument to the real-time financial imbalances 
𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 . Whereas the Taylor rule (equation 9) measures the “intended” policy response to Fed’s dual 
objectives, the 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 sensitivities (estimated in equation 10) correspond to the “apparent” link 
between policy and real-time financial imbalances that market participants can measure.10 
The second step links changes in the systematic sensitivity of US monetary policy to real-
time financial imbalances, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡, to the future evolution of the financial cycle, 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑥𝑥 , an ex post 
measure. We estimate this relationship using the local projections method à la Jordà (2005)11, 
associating the systematic reaction coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 to the evolution of the financial variables ℎ-
months ahead: 
 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑥𝑥 = 𝛼𝛼ℎ + 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙,ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1𝑥𝑥 + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,ℎ𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋,ℎ𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ,𝑡𝑡 . (11) 
The significance of 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,ℎ indicates the strength of the reaction function channel, operating beyond 
the effect of other channels captured by the vector of controls 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 . In its simplest form, 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 includes 
the policy rate 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋,𝑡𝑡 and 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡 such that it nests the narrow risk-taking channel as well as how 
policy responsiveness to macroeconomic variables may affect financial imbalances.  
 An advantage of a two-step procedure is that it allows a separate economic interpretation 
of each stage output. A downside is added estimation uncertainty. We address this concern in 
two ways. First, we penalise the first-stage inference when estimates are noisier, by normalising 
the estimated parameters in equation 10 by their standard error and use these in the second 
                                                     
9  Based on the argument that the sluggish partial adjustment of the policy interest rate reflects the persistence of 
macroeconomic variables rather than policy gradualism, equation 9 does not include a lag of the policy instrument. 
Rudebusch (2006) and Carrillo et al. (2007) provide empirical and structural evidence that policy inertia is low. 
10  Estimating equations 9 and 10 in one step does not affect our main result (see the robustness section). 
11  Local projections have become a popular tool for computing impulse responses because of their robustness to model 
misspecification. They require the estimation of a series of h regressions, one for each horizon h, with the estimated 
coefficient representing the response of the dependent variable at the horizon h to a given shock at time t. 
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stage. In other words, this method uses a risk-adjusted measure of perceived policy sensitivity to 
financial variables – one rationale is that investors should discount a correlation they observe 
more when it is noisier. Second, we estimate bootstrapped standard errors to take into account 
the generated regressor uncertainty. The main result of the paper is unaffected by both 
robustness tests – see Section 3.4. 
2.2 Measuring financial imbalances 
We construct measures of financial imbalances, which serve as indicators for financial stability risk 
that could justify a monetary policy response. We distinguish between real-time and ex post 
measures. The former is available as an input into monetary policy deliberations, while the latter 
can only be inferred with hindsight. We use the ex post measures to assess whether the apparent 
policy reaction observed in real time has any success in influencing subsequent financial 
developments. As it can be more difficult to ascertain the size of imbalances in real time than with 
the benefit of hindsight, this distinction is potentially important for a precise assessment of the 
reaction function channel. 
One way to quantify financial imbalances is to assess the extent to which relevant financial 
variables are consistent with their underlying fundamentals. Each of the three financial markets is 
thus assigned one fundamental variable – earnings for the equity market, rents for the housing 
market, and GDP for the credit market (see Annex A1 for data definitions).12 We cyclically adjust 
these fundamental variables to remove the influence of the business cycles, by computing their 
moving averages.13 This procedure mirrors the cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio (CAPE) 
proposed by Shiller (2000). The smoothed series represent the underlying trends in fundamentals, 
against which movements in asset prices and credit are compared. 
Financial imbalances are computed via bivariate regressions. Denote the cyclically 
adjusted fundamental variable in financial market 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡 by 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 , where 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝑆𝑆,𝐻𝐻,𝐶𝐶} 
corresponds to the stock, housing and credit markets respectively. The dependent variable 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is 
the stock price, the house price, and the volume of credit. For each market 𝑗𝑗 and period 𝑡𝑡, we run 
the following regression: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,0 + 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,1𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (12) 
The estimation sample starts from a fixed date (January 1971) up to 𝑡𝑡, where 𝑡𝑡 ranges from January 
1979 to June 2017, giving a minimum estimation period of 96 months. The residual 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡 
represents our first real-time measure of financial imbalances. It captures deviation of 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 from its 
fundamentals-consistent level, based on information available at time 𝑡𝑡.14  
                                                     
12  For robustness purposes, we replace current earnings by expectations of future earnings one year ahead in equation 
12 for the stock market, in order to capture investors’ forward-looking behaviour (see subsection 3.4). 
13  We also compute the Christiano-Fitzgerald trend of each fundamental variable as an alternative measure of the 
cyclically adjusted fundamental and this does not affect our later results. 
14  The rolling estimation of 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,0 and 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,1 allows a flexible modelling of potentially time-varying relationships between 
the financial variables and their respective fundamentals. Another approach is to de-trend ratios such as the price-to-
earning or credit-to-GDP ratios. This latter method however assumes joint restrictions that 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,1 = 1 and 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,0 can only 
move slowly over time.    
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The same specification can be estimated over the full sample, to exploit the benefit of 
hindsight and identify those historical episodes when growing imbalances became unsustainable 
and ended in a disorderly way.  
 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,0 + 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,1𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡 (13) 
The resulting residual 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is the ex post imbalance measure. The R² of this regression is 0.88, 
0.90 and 0.98 for stock, house and credit dynamics respectively, and supports the overall 
relevance of the fundamentals.  
Figure 1 – Real-time and ex post financial imbalances  
 
Note: These charts show the real-time and ex post financial imbalance measures 
for stock prices, house prices and credit volumes respectively, estimated based 
on equations 12 and 13. The sample period for estimating the cyclically adjusted 
fundamentals of these asset classes is January 1971 – June 2017, so the sample 
period for estimating these measures is January 1979 – June 2017. Each variable 
is normalised by its standard deviation. The real-time measures of financial 
imbalances are plotted in blue and the ex post measure in circled red. The shaded 
area plots the respective asset prices and credit volumes. 
Despite different conditioning information, real-time imbalances 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 and ex post 
measures 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  share broadly similar patterns in each of the three financial markets (Figure 1). 
The patterns are also consistent with the literature’s identification of financial boom and crisis 
episodes. For example, the stock market indicator identifies the boom in the late 1990s, as well 
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as the sharp contraction during 2000–2001, the dot-com bubble collapse.15 In the housing and 
credit markets, the build-up in financial imbalances corresponds to the few years leading up to 
the GFC in 2008. Outside of these well-known episodes, the variations in the real-time and ex 
post financial imbalances are more moderate in size, but still not negligible.  
2.3 Estimating the policy reaction function 
This section turns to the estimation of the perceived US monetary policy reaction function. We 
start by first estimating the standard forward-looking Taylor rule over a rolling window, according 
to equation 9. The policy rate is the nominal fed funds rate up to 2009 when it reaches its effective 
lower bound, and a shadow rate afterwards (see Krippner (2013)). We use the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters’ median macroeconomic forecasts (SPF) as observables for expected 
inflation and unemployment. These variables are not subject to revisions, and capture 
policymakers’ apparent reactions as can be inferred in real time. The Taylor rule is estimated over 
a rolling sample covering the average business cycle length of eight years.16 This approach is also 
a simple way to approximate any non-linearities (such as asymmetric responses or threshold 
effects) in the policy rule, e.g. to allow for a ‘put’ strategy where the central bank reacts more to 
financial variables in busts than in booms. 
We supplement this baseline analysis by estimating equation 9 with (i) the shadow rate 
of Wu and Xia (2016), (ii) nominal two-year interest rates as a proxy for the policy tool in the 
period of unconventional policies following Hanson and Stein (2015)17, and (iii) Greenbook 
forecasts over a smaller sample ending in 2012 (due to the five-year embargo). These alternative 
specifications are discussed in the robustness section 3.4. 
On average, policy reacts positively to higher inflation and negatively to the 
unemployment rate in the usual way (Annex A2). But the estimated coefficients also exhibit 
significant time variations. Up to the GFC, the weight on inflation was relatively stable but then 
became less prominent as monetary policy entered crisis mode. The response to the 
unemployment rate generally remained countercyclical, except during the Volcker era when the 
weight on inflation increased as recessions were tolerated to bring inflation down. These time-
varying estimates are consistent with previous studies such as Boivin (2006). More recently after 
the GFC, the response to the unemployment gap weakened, possibly as the FOMC’s lower bound 
on the policy interest rate constrained its ability to respond. 
                                                     
15  Phillips (2012) proposes a method of detecting a bubble-like behaviour, based on the unit-root property of the asset 
price. We adapt this unit-root criterion in a robustness test and find that our approach yields similar inferences 
especially for episodes of wide swings in financial conditions. 
16  For consistency, the windows for computing rolling regressions and moving averages are always eight years 
throughout the paper. This window covers two terms of the Federal Reserve Chair (four years per term), and is close 
to the average time served by Fed Governors since the creation of the FOMC in 1935 (7.9 years). See FRB Kansas City 
(2009). Annex A2 shows the time-varying estimates of this standard Taylor rule specification. 
17  An advantage of using an observable variable such as the two-year Treasury yield as the policy variable is that it avoids 
potential issues associated with generated regressors (see Krippner (2019) for a recent critique). 
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To estimate the apparent policy sensitivity to financial variables, we regress the Taylor 
rule residuals on our measures of financial imbalances, as well as control variables.18 We estimate 
on a rolling sample basis: 
 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡′𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 (14) 
where, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 is a vector consisting of annual changes in the oil price and the VIX index, the natural 
candidates beyond inflation and output that investors think could be relevant for the central bank 
when setting policy. The loadings 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 ,𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻,𝑡𝑡 and 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 track the systematic sensitivity of the monetary 
policy instrument to the financial imbalance indicators. A positive (negative) loading represents a 
counter(pro)cyclical sensitivity to financial imbalances. These loadings are shown as the solid 
black lines in the left-column panels of Figure 2, and exhibit discernible variations over time. 
Figure 2 – Estimated policy sensitivities to financial imbalances 
 
 
 
Note: These charts show the sensitivity of the Taylor rule residuals to real-time measures of financial imbalances. Rows 
correspond to stock prices, house prices and credit volumes respectively. On the left column, dark lines represent 
estimates based on the baseline specification (equation 14). Green dotted lines are estimates based on a restricted 
specification where only one financial imbalance is included. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. The 
right column show policy sensitivities normalised by their time-varying standard errors. The sample period is January 
1987 – June 2017.  
We supplement these baseline loadings by three additional estimates. First, we restrict 
equation 14 to include only a single variable at a time (RTIS, RTIH or RTIC). This restriction imposes 
a strong assumption that each investor focuses narrowly on her market of specialty, ignoring the 
possibility that monetary policy could be reacting to many markets at the same time. While 
suffering from a potential omitted variable bias, this restricted specification evades any inference 
                                                     
18  We have also controlled for some lags of the interest rate to take into account the persistence of the policy instrument, 
and this does not affect our main results. 
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challenge associated with a high cross-market comovement.19 The resulting single-market 
loadings are shown as green dashed lines on the left column of Figure 2.  
The two remaining alternatives are the risk-adjusted counterparts of the previous ones, 
computed as the ratios of the point estimates and their standard errors. This adjustment takes 
into account the substantial time variations of estimates’ volatility (shaded areas on the left 
column), and allows investors to discount the loading estimates that are noisier. The risk-adjusted 
loadings, depicted on the right column of Figure 2, suggest that there were meaningful variations 
in policy reaction even in the second half of the sample. After adjusting for risks, policy loadings 
from the baseline and single-market models also appear more tightly correlated.  
All four estimates suggest that US monetary policy has not systematically reacted to 
financial imbalances in a countercyclical way. This stands in contrast to the systematic and 
countercylical policy reaction vis-à-vis inflation and unemployment, the key mandate of the 
Federal Reserve. For the stock market, policy appears to be procyclical or neutral over a significant 
part of the sample. This includes almost the entire first half of the sample – only after the stock 
market bubble burst in early 2000s did policy reaction turn countercyclical. For the housing and 
credit markets, there is similarly no regular pattern of countercyclical policy reaction. In the mid-
2000s before the crisis, all estimates notably suggest that monetary policy was either neutral or 
procyclical vis-à-vis imbalances in the housing and credit markets. 
We exploit these variations in the policy loadings to examine their implications for 
subsequent financial imbalances. We choose the policy loadings from the multivariate model in 
equation 14 as the baseline to organise the results. However, we are agnostic about which policy 
loadings best represent investors’ perception, and replicate all key results with alternative loading 
estimates (see section 3.4). The main result of the paper holds in all cases.  
2.4 Effects of policy reaction on the financial cycles 
The final step is to assess whether estimated policy sensitivities to real-time financial imbalances 
can predict the developments of ex post financial imbalances. We estimate the local projection 
specification using the ex post imbalance measure of each market 𝑗𝑗 as the dependent variable: 
 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼𝛼ℎ + 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵,ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋,ℎ𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑈𝑈,ℎ𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡 …+ 𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆,ℎ𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻,ℎ𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶,ℎ𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ,𝑡𝑡 (15) 
where ℎ is the time lag between policy and ex post imbalance measures (up to 36 months). The 
independent variables include lagged ex post imbalances, the nominal interest rate level, policy 
sensitivity to inflation and unemployment, and policy sensitivity to real-time imbalances in each 
                                                     
19  This tradeoff may be important in the late 1990s to early 2000s where housing and credit imbalances were most 
correlated, and the gaps between the baseline and single-variable estimates largest. Even if ‘collinearity’ was a serious 
issue, investors may still want to use the multivariate model and do their best to disentangle monetary policy 
responses to different markets. Indeed, the FOMC minutes in the early 2000s suggest that the Fed recognised distinct 
drivers of the housing and credit developments, as well as their different implications. The FOMC linked elevated 
house prices to strong income, low long-term interest rates, and possibly speculation. By mid-2005, this led to an 
active debate regarding the role of monetary policy. Meanwhile, the FOMC viewed strong loan growth and mortgage 
refinancing activity over this period as generally positive for aggregate spending, as they indicated equity extraction.   
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financial market 𝑗𝑗.20 We compute heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West 
standard errors assuming that the autocorrelation dies out after three months. 
Figure 3 – Responses of financial imbalances to policy loadings 
Stock prices House prices Credit volumes 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of the ex post imbalances for stock prices, house 
prices and credit volumes respectively (estimated with equation 15) to changes in the policy loadings on real-time 
imbalances for stock prices, house prices and credit volumes respectively (estimated with equation 14). Each 
variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 
68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
Greater policy sensitivity to market 𝑗𝑗 has a consistently negative effect on the ex post 
imbalances across the three markets and at all horizons considered (Figure 3). A monetary policy 
reaction function that appears to lean against growing imbalances in real time tends to be 
associated with a subsequent decline in the degree of imbalances in that particular market. The 
effect is also generally quite persistent, typically strongest after three years. The estimate is in the 
same order of magnitude for the three markets, slightly weaker in the equity market compared 
with the housing and credit markets. For example, a percentage point increase in the policy 
sensitivity to stock price developments reduces the subsequent imbalance in the market measure 
by 0.15 standard deviation after 30 months.21 
Could policy sensitivity to imbalances induce a dampening effect because this signals a 
higher interest rate path in the future, another guise of the narrow risk-taking channel? To 
disentangle the reaction function channel from this possibility, we augment equation 15 with 
survey measures of private expectations of future short-term interest rates (from the SPF). The 
results (shown in Annex A5) confirm the importance of the reaction function channel even after 
controlling for expected interest rate path. 
 
                                                     
20   Using an observable price/earnings ratio (PE) in place of an estimated measure of equity imbalances does not affect 
the main result (Annex A3). Neither does allowing for a more general lag structure in equation 15 with up to three 
lags of the endogenous variable and the policy instrument (Annex A4). 
21  The standard deviation of stock prices to their fundamentals is around 30% of the average value of stock prices over 
the sample considered, so a decrease of 0.15 SD in the stock boom-bust measure represents a 4.5% decrease in the 
stock price deviation to earnings. A decrease of 0.3 SD in the housing boom-bust measure represents a 5.5% decrease 
in the house price deviation to rents. A decrease of 0.3 SD in the credit boom-bust measure represents a 3% decrease 
in the credit volume deviation to GDP. 
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Could the result be driven by policy responses to negative financial shocks – e.g. could a 
stock market crash induce both an immediate policy rate cut and lower stock prices subsequently? 
To examine this possibility, we augment equation 15 with the VIX index at horizons h = 0, 12, 24 
and 36 months to control for the effect of financial shocks. As Annex A6 shows, the dampening 
effect of the reaction function channel survives this extension. 
Any reverse causality bias – i.e. policy reacts more to financial imbalances because the 
central bank anticipates larger financial booms – should not be a major concern for two reasons. 
First, the central bank is less likely to respond to forecasts of imbalances further out in the future, 
making any reverse causality bias less severe the longer the horizon. Second, to the extent that 
the central bank intends to act countercyclically, the sign of the reverse causality bias would be 
positive, implying a stronger reaction function channel than the baseline estimates suggest. 
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Figure 4 – Responses of imbalances to the policy rate and loadings on macroeconomic variables   
 
 Stock prices House prices Credit volumes 
Po
lic
y r
ate
 
   
Inf
lat
ion
 lo
ad
ing
 
   
Un
em
plo
ym
en
t lo
ad
ing
 
   
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of the ex post financial imbalances for stock prices, 
house prices and credit volumes respectively to changes in the policy instrument and to changes in policy loadings 
on expected inflation and unemployment, estimated with equation 15. Each variable is normalised by its standard 
deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, 
computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. 
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3. Extensions 
3.1 Risk-taking channel and sensitivity to unemployment and inflation  
The policy rate as well as policy loadings on macroeconomic variables also significantly influence 
the evolution of financial imbalances (Figure 4). A higher nominal interest rate deflates imbalances 
in all three markets, confirming the presence of a narrow risk-taking channel. Moreover, a greater 
sensitivity to inflation has a dampening effect on the stock and credit markets, with a more 
ambiguous impact on the housing market. Finally, a less sensitive response to labour market slack 
tends to encourage financial imbalances in all three markets. Strikingly, all these results are 
consistent with the findings of Bianchi et al (2018), i.e. low asset valuations tend to coincide with 
a higher interest rate, a greater responsiveness of policy rate to inflation, and a lower sensitivity 
of policy to output growth.  
Table 1 – Variance decomposition 
 
Note: This table shows the overall variance of the ex post financial imbalances 
explained by equation 15 for the three financial markets considered – the R² measure. 
It also shows the average variance, over 36 months, explained individually by the 
policy loadings on corresponding real-time financial imbalances, loading on the two 
macroeconomic variables, and the policy stance – the partial R² measure. 
Quantitatively, the reaction function channel appears just as important as these other 
channels, if not more so. When estimating equation 15, we compute the partial R² of the policy 
loadings on financial imbalances, and do the same for policy loadings on macro variables and the 
level of policy rate for comparison. As Table 1 shows, the policy loadings on financial imbalances 
explain 4–13% of the variance of ex post imbalances over 36 months. The level of policy rate 
explains about 1–9%. Inflation and unemployment loadings explain 2–15% of the variance of ex 
post imbalances. For all three financial markets, the contribution of the reaction function channel 
is at least comparable to the alternative channels, and is highest in the case of the housing market. 
3.2 The role of a central bank put 
An asymmetric policy reaction vis-à-vis booms and busts could also influence financial risk-taking. 
In particular, a ‘central bank put’, i.e. a perception that policy will ease strongly in busts but remain 
inactive in booms, could provide greater incentives to speculate by limiting the tailed-event 
capital loss. A central bank put perception could thus further strengthen financial risk-taking in 
Stock Housing Credit
R² 0.62 0.64 0.78
Stock prices loading 0.04
Housing prices loading 0.13
Credit volumes loading 0.09
Policy stance 0.01 0.09 0.07
Inflation loading 0.06 0.02 0.12
Unemployment loading 0.03 0.05 0.15
Partial R²
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addition to our reaction function channel.22 Echoing the earlier findings of Borio and Lowe (2004), 
we find some evidence of an ex post central bank put for the stock market, with lower financial 
imbalances being associated with greater policy sensitivity (Table 2, first three columns). 
Table 2 – Correlation between policy sensitivity and financial imbalances 
and between a put perception and peaks of financial cycles 
 
Note: The first three columns of this table show the correlation between policy sensitivity to a 
given financial variables and the real-time imbalance for that variable, by regressing the former 
on the latter. The last column shows the correlation between the variable FFRput and real-time 
stock price imbalances. FFRput is defined as 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 − 50𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 ≥
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 + 50𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝), where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 is the fed funds rate and 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 is the mode of the market-implied 
distribution of 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅, nine months ahead. This skewness measure serves as a proxy for central bank 
put. Peak Stock is a dummy variable that equals 1 during the 12 months leading up to peaks in 
stock price cycles. 
 For a policy put to affect risk-taking, it must be anticipated before a bust materialises. To 
measure the degree of put perception ex ante, we use a market-implied probability distribution 
of the future fed funds rate from the overnight index swap (OIS). We construct a skewness 
measure of this distribution, as the probability of the fed funds rate falling more than 50 basis 
points below the mode minus the conjugate probability that it will be more than 50 basis points 
above the mode, over a nine-month horizon (the longest available with reliable liquidity). A higher 
number indicates the policy rate distribution is tilted to the downside – a crude gauge of a policy 
put. This measure is positively associated with peaks of stock price cycles, so that the perception 
of a central bank put is higher during the later stage of a stock market boom (Table 2, last 
column).23 The result is consistent with the interpretation that, even when investors foresee a 
greater chance of a stock market crash, they simultaneously expect a Fed rescue in that event and 
hence continue to take on more risk than otherwise. 
                                                     
22  Like the reaction function channel, the effect of a central bank put operates through the anticipated response of 
policymakers. We differentiate them because the mechanisms through which they affect risk-taking are different.  
23  Because the binding zero lower bound period mechanically affects this skewness measure, we re-estimate this 
coefficient outside of this period – the coefficient is smaller (0.069) but remains significant at the 1% level. 
RTI Stock RTI Housing RTI Credit Peak Stock
β S,t βH,t βC,t FFRput t
ρj -1.031*** -0.314 -0.477 .
[0.388] [0.442] [0.333]
ρj . . . 0.102***
[0.013]
N 364 364 364 182
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Figure 5 – Responses of stock market imbalances to put perception 
and policy loading on real-time stock imbalances   
   
 
Note: The chart shows the dynamic responses over 36 months of the ex post stock 
price imbalances to changes in policy loadings on real-time stock imbalances, 
estimated with equation 15. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. 
The sample period is May 2002 – June 2017. Because of a smaller sample due to 
limited availability of market-implied probability, we estimate the dynamic 
responses over a shorter horizon, up to h=24 months. Grey areas show 68% and 
95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
robust standard errors. 
To jointly assess the impact of central bank put and the reaction function channel, we 
augment equation 15 with the perceived central bank put measure. Figure 5 plots the impulse 
responses of the stock market ex post imbalances to an increase in the central bank put 
perception (left) and the policy sensitivity to real-time imbalances (right). Findings suggest that 
the two channels coexist and operate alongside one another. A stock market boom can be 
propelled by both a weak policy reaction to it (the reaction function channel), and an anticipation 
that policy will ease strongly should the boom turns into a bust (the central bank put). 
3.3 Boom-bust amplitudes 
If the boom sows the seeds for the subsequent bust (Borio (2012)), then a policy reaction that 
mitigates the former could also reduce the severity of the latter. In this section, we investigate 
whether a more countercyclical policy reaction reduces the amplitude of the boom-bust cycle, i.e. 
containing not only the boom but also the extent of the bust once it occurs. This second-moment 
exercise complements the baseline case, which concerns the level effect of the policy reaction.  
Our amplitude measure is the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the 
ex post imbalances over a rolling 36-month window. We estimate equation 15 using this 
amplitude measure as the dependent variable instead of the level of ex post imbalances. The 
results, shown in Table 3, suggest that a more countercyclical policy reaction significantly reduces 
the boom-bust cycle amplitudes in the stock and housing markets. 
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Table 3 – Boom-bust amplitudes 
 
Note: This table shows the responses of the financial cycle amplitude, 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+36, to changes in the policy loadings on real-time imbalances for the 
three financial markets. We define 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+36 ≡ 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝��𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡0 − 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡1� |𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡1 ∈[𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡 + 36]�, namely the difference between the maximum and the minimum 
of ex post imbalances over a 36-month period. Each variable is normalised by 
its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors in parentheses.  
3.4 Robustness tests 
The baseline findings are robust to various alternative measures of financial imbalances (real-time 
or ex post), estimates of policy loadings, and accounting for parameter uncertainty. 
Alternative real-time imbalances 
We consider three alternative real-time imbalances. First, we perform a log transformation of the 
level of the three financial variables to normalise their variation across time (Annex A7 plots the 
time series of log financial imbalances). The logarithm transformation linearises changes in time 
series such that the slope of the log data is approximatively equal to the percentage growth in 
the original series. With log data, percentage changes at any different points in time are 
comparable. Second, we re-estimate the regression of financial variables on their fundamentals 
(equation 12) using a fixed-size rolling sample rather than an expanding window. Third, we 
replace the current earnings in equation 12 by expectations of future earnings one year ahead to 
capture investors’ forward-looking expectations. Annex A7 depicts the resulting impulse 
responses, which confirm the main conclusions of the baseline model.  
Alternative ex post imbalances 
We consider three alternative ex post imbalance measures. The first is a log transformation of the 
baseline series (Annex A8 plots these variables). The second alternative is the product between 
the original measure 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 and its first and second differences: 
 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡 ∗ Δ𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∗ Δ2𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡 (16) 
This triple-interaction object incorporates the higher momentum effects, recognising not only the 
size of financial imbalances but also when these gaps are growing and accelerating. This measure 
is closely related to the unit-root criterion of Phillips (2012) (see Annex A8 for the time series). As 
the third candidate, we borrow the bubble measure from Blot et al (2018) and use it as an 
externally identified boom-bust indicator. This method combines three different methodologies 
used in the literature – structural, econometric and statistical – to identify asset price bubbles in 
Stock Housing Credit
Amp j,t+36 Amp j,t+36 Amp j,t+36
α j -0.074** -0.203*** 0.009
[0.037] [0.059] [0.089]
N 331 331 328
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the stock and housing markets. The main result holds across these three alternative measures, as 
shown by the impulse responses reported in Annex A8.  
Alternative policy reaction functions 
We assess the robustness of our main result to four alternative Taylor rules. First, we use nominal 
two-year interest rates as the policy rate instead of a mix of the fed funds rate before 2009 and a 
shadow rate after. Second, we use the shadow rate of Wu and Xia (2016) in place of Krippner 
(2013). Third, we replace SPF inflation and unemployment forecasts by Greenbook forecasts. 
Fourth, we re-estimate the policy reaction function (equation 14) using real-time imbalances from 
only one financial market at a time to check for multicollinearity. As shown in Annex A9, none of 
these fundamentally changes the baseline results.    
Accounting for parameter uncertainty 
The estimated policy loadings entail parameter uncertainty, which we account for via two 
exercises. First, we construct risk-adjusted measures of the policy sensitivity, by normalising 
𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 ,𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻,𝑡𝑡 and 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 by their respective standard error σj (see Figure 2 for time series). We do so for 
the baseline specification of equation 14 and for the alternative version that restricts equation 14 
to include only a single financial variable at a time. These two measures allow for the possibility 
that investors adjust their risk-taking by less when they have a weaker conviction about the policy 
reaction function because it can only be estimated with a high degree of noise. As shown in Annex 
A9, these alternative measures of policy loading do not materially affect the baseline responses. 
In the second exercise, we perform a Monte Carlo bootstrap-like estimation. We draw 
2,000 complete time series for policy loading, taking an independent draw of ?̂?𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 for each market 
and each period at a time. In doing so, we assume ?̂?𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is normally distributed with means and 
variances given by the first-stage baseline estimates.24 For each of the resulting 2,000 time series 
of policy loadings, we then perform the second-stage estimation. Annex A9 shows the impulse 
responses from the exercise. A more countercyclical monetary policy now has a smaller 
dampening effect on financial imbalances in all three markets – the point estimates of impulse 
responses nearly halve. At the same time, the bootstrap standard error band is quite tight, and 
the estimated impulse responses remain highly significant in all cases. These results are therefore 
consistent qualitatively with the baseline finding. 
Conclusion 
Our study highlights the importance of the “policy reaction function” channel of monetary policy. 
We find that changes in the Federal Reserve’s apparent reaction function affect the development 
of US financial imbalances. When monetary policy appears less sensitive to financial conditions, 
financial imbalances tend to grow, potentially exacerbating the financial boom-bust cycles. 
                                                     
24  Because our empirical strategy relies on time variations of policy loadings, the standard block bootstrap is not feasible 
as it assumes constant parameters across the multiple draws of observations.  
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Because we have controlled for monetary policy stance, both in terms of the current and the 
expected path of policy interest rate, this relationship is distinct from the standard risk-taking 
channel most studies focus on. 
This result extends the vast empirical findings that risk-taking decisions depend on the 
levels of interest rates, and points at the more expansive effects of monetary policy through its 
systematic behaviour. Our investigation offers only an early glimpse into this rich and potentially 
rewarding avenue, and clearly further research is warranted. One empirical agenda is to use micro-
level measures of perceived policy reaction function, e.g. based on surveys or internal reports at 
institutional levels, to examine if our findings can be corroborated. On the theoretical front, our 
findings call for incorporating the rich interactions between monetary policy-setting and market 
participants’ beliefs more fully into models used to guide policy.  
In terms of policy implications, our findings provide new insights. To preserve financial 
stability, a central bank can do more than tighten policy on a discretionary basis when concerned 
about excessive risk-taking. Reacting systematically to developments of financial imbalances, and 
communicating such an intention even when financial stability risks may still be remote, can also 
yield benefits. Again, a useful analogy may be that of inflation stabilisation. The Taylor rule helps 
anchor inflation expectations because it provides economic agents with information about how 
policy would react to future shocks. In a similar vein, how market participants expect monetary 
policy to evolve with financial imbalances can endogenously determine the resulting financial 
boom-bust process. Our empirical finding has potentially far-reaching implications for the design 
of a macro-financial policy framework. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Data sources and coverage 
 
Note: These series are available from January 1963 at minimum (House prices) until June 2017. 
  
Variables Series Data sources 
Stock prices S&P 500 stock price index, monthly average, 
2010=100 
BIS 
Earnings Computed based on Stock prices and the S&P 
500 price to earnings ratio, monthly average 
Bloomberg 
House prices Residential property prices, nominal, 
2010=100,  linear monthly interpolation 
BIS 
Rents Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers: Rent of primary residence, Index 
1982-1984=100 
FRED 
Credit Total credit to non-financial private sector,  
linear monthly interpolation 
BIS 
Real GDP Real GDP, seasonally adjusted, linear monthly 
interpolation 
BIS 
Policy rate Federal Funds rate target BIS 
Krippner rate Shadow rate Krippner’s webpage 
CPI Consumer prices index, year-on-year changes BIS 
Unemployment Unemployment rate, SA BIS 
VIX CBOE Volatility Index: VIX©, Index, monthly 
average 
FRED 
Oil prices Spot Crude Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI),  year-on-year changes 
FRED 
SPF_PGDP_1y Survey of Professional Forecasters, GDP 
deflator, four-quarter horizon, median of 
respondents, linear monthly interpolation  
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia 
SPF_Unemp_1y Survey of Professional Forecasters, 
unemployment rate, four-quarter horizon, 
median of respondents, linear monthly 
interpolation  
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia 
Ubar Natural Rate of Unemployment (Long-Term) CBO via FRED 
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A.2 Time-varying estimates of the standard Taylor rule  
 
 
 
Note: The top two panels show real-time measures of the Federal Reserve’s policy 
response to expected inflation and unemployment respectively, estimated based 
on equation 10 over rolling windows. The sample period is January 1979 – June 
2017. The last panel shows the residuals of equation 10. 
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A.3 Robustness using an observable proxy of financial imbalances 
We use an alternative specification for equity markets to highlight the robustness of the main 
result of the paper. The financial variable is the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of the S&P 500 index, 
a commonly used observable proxy for equity price valuation (𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡).  
 
Note: This chart plots the time series of the Price/Earnings ratio of the SP500. 
 
Using equation 9, we regress the Taylor rule residuals on the P/E ratio on a rolling basis. We then 
relate the resulting estimate of the systematic policy reaction to P/E, 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡, to the subsequent 
evolution of the P/E ratio, for horizon ℎ up to 36 months, using the local projection (equation 15). 
The evidence points to a significant reaction function channel. The left panel shows the coefficient 
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡 which describes how the central bank responds to P/E dynamics over time. The right panel 
shows the coefficient 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,ℎ which relates the reaction coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡 to the evolution of the P/E 
ratio itself. The impulse response is significantly negative up to the one-year horizon.   
Fed response to the P/E ratio PEt+h response to βPE,t 
 
Note: the left panel shows the coefficient βPE,t which describes how the central bank responds to P/E dynamics 
over time. This coefficient is estimated using equation 9 using a rolling window of eight years. The right panel 
shows the coefficient αPE,h which relates the reaction coefficient βPE,t to the evolution of the P/E ratio itself. In 
other words, it shows the dynamic responses over 36 months of the P/E ratio to βPE,t. The sample period is 
January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
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A.4 IRFs with a more general lag structure 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and 
credit markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and 
credit markets respectively, estimated with equation 15 augmented with three lags of the endogenous variable and 
three lags of the policy instrument. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is 
January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
A.5 IRFs when controlling for SPF three-month interest rate expectations 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and 
credit markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and 
credit markets respectively, estimated with equation 15 augmented with SPF three-month interest rate expectations. 
Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas 
show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors.  
A.6 IRFs when controlling for the VIX at different dates 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and 
credit markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and 
credit markets respectively, estimated with equation 15 augmented with the VIX index at h = 0, 12, 24 and 36. Each 
variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 
68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.   
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A.7 Alternative real-time imbalances 
Alternative real-time measures of financial imbalances: log variables 
 
Note: These charts show real-time log measures of financial imbalances in the 
stock, housing and credit markets respectively, estimated based on equation 
12 over an expanding estimation window. The sample period for estimating 
the cyclically adjusted fundamental of these assets is January 1971 – June 
2017, so the sample period for estimating these real-time measures is January 
1979 – June 2017. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. For 
comparison, the real-time measures of financial imbalances are plotted 
alongside (in blue). 
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IRFs with log real-time financial imbalances  
   
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and credit 
markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on log real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and credit 
markets respectively, estimated based on equation 15. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample 
period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
IRFs with rolling-window real-time financial imbalances  
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and credit 
markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on rolling-window real-time imbalances in the stock, housing 
and credit markets respectively, estimated based on equation 15. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. 
The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
IRFs with forward earnings 12-months ahead  
 
Note: This chart shows the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock market 
to changes in the policy loadings on rolling-window real-time imbalances in the stock market, estimated 
based on equation 15. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% 
confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.   
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A.8 Alternative ex post imbalances 
Alternative ex post imbalances: log variables 
 
Note: These charts show log ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and 
credit markets respectively, estimated based on equation 13. The sample 
period for estimating the cyclically adjusted fundamental of these assets is 
January 1971 – June 2017, so the sample period for estimating these 
measures is January 1979 – June 2017. Each variable is normalised by its 
standard deviation. For comparison, the original ex post imbalances are 
plotted alongside (in blue). 
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Alternative ex post imbalances: triple interaction 
 
 
 
Note: These charts show the triple interaction measure (computed based on 
equation 14) of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and credit markets 
respectively, estimated based on equation 13. The sample period for 
estimating the cyclically adjusted fundamental of these assets is January 1971 
– June 2017, so the sample period for estimating these measures is January 
1979 – June 2017. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation.  
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IRFs with log ex post imbalances 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of log ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and 
credit markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and credit 
markets respectively, estimated based on equation 15. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The 
sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
IRFs with triple interaction 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of the triple interaction measure (computed with 
equation 17), estimated based on equation 15. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period 
is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
IRFs with Blot et al (2018)’s bubble measures 
  
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock and housing 
markets respectively, computed according to Blot et al (2018), respectively to changes in the policy loadings on real-
time imbalances in the stock and housing markets respectively, estimated based on equation 15. Each variable is 
normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% 
confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.   
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A.9 Alternative policy reaction functions 
IRFs with two-year interest rates as the policy tool 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and credit 
markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and credit markets 
respectively, estimated based on equation 15. The two-year government bond yield is used as the policy instrument. Each 
variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 
95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
IRFs with the shadow rate of Wu and Xia (2016) 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and credit 
markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and credit markets 
respectively, estimated based on equation 15. The shadow rate from Wu and Xia (2016) is used as the policy instrument. 
Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 
68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
IRFs with Greenbook forecasts in the Taylor rule 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and credit 
markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and credit markets 
respectively, estimated based on equation 15. Greenbook forecasts of inflation and unemployment are used in the policy 
rule. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 
68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. 
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IRFs with sensitivities to stock, housing and credit imbalances estimated separately 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and credit 
markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings, estimated with equation 14 restricted to include only one 
corresponding market at a time, for real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and credit markets respectively. Each 
variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% 
and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors 
IRFs with Beta/Sigma 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months, estimated based on equation 15, of ex post 
imbalances in the stock, housing and credit markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings, normalised by their 
standard errors, on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and credit markets respectively. Each variable is 
normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% 
confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
IRFs with Beta/Sigma estimated separately 
 
Note: These charts show the dynamic responses over 36 months, estimated based on equation 15, of ex post 
imbalances in the stock, housing and credit markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings, normalised by their 
standard errors, on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and credit markets respectively, estimated with equation 
14 restricted to include only one corresponding market at a time. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. 
The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. Grey areas show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.  
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IRFs from a Monte-Carlo simulation of policy sensitivities 
 
Note: These charts show the mean dynamic responses (together with the mean standard errors for confidence intervals) 
estimated based on equation 15 using 2,000 simulated series of policy sensitivities to real-time imbalances in the stock, 
housing and credit markets obtained from random draws from the estimated distribution of these parameters from 
equations 9 and 10. These dynamic responses span 36 months and are of ex post imbalances in the stock, housing and 
credit markets respectively to changes in the policy loadings on real-time imbalances in the stock, housing and credit 
markets respectively. Each variable is normalised by its standard deviation. The sample period is January 1987 – June 2017. 
Grey areas show 68% and 95% confidence intervals, computed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust 
standard errors.  
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